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ON EQUALITY, BIAS CRIMES, AND JUST DESSERTS
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Kenneth W. Simons1
(Draft:: August 31, 2000)

Much of the appeal of retributive theories of criminal law flows from
what they are not.

Most importantly, they are not utilitarian,

consequentialist, deterrence-oriented theories.

They do not allow

punishment of the innocent in order to serve a large social good. They do
not permit selecting an offender for extremely harsh punishment by lottery,
even if this would expend fewer overall social resources than imposing
lower and proportionate punishment on all similar offenders.

More

generally, they would not permit exemplary punishment of an offender that
is disproportionate to his just deserts, even if this would serve a significant
deterrent function or would appease public anger. In short, retributivists
would place significant limits on the state’s ability to promote social
welfare at the expense of fairness to the individual defendant.
But Professors Alon Harel and Gideon Parchomovsky enter the
debate about the proper rationales for punishment with a tempting
proposition.2 Why not widen the retributive focus beyond the culpability of
the offender and the wrongdoing he commits, to encompass egalitarian
concerns? The authors offer this suggestion for two reasons—to give a
convincing justification of bias crime legislation, and, more broadly, to
remedy what they characterize as the retributive approach’s inadequate
attention to the interests of crime victims. In their view, the retributivist
1
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Alon Harel and Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 Yale L. J. 507 (1999)

(hereafter “On Hate and Equality”).
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approach gives an inadequate justification of bias crimes and cannot
explain the state’s egalitarian duty to protect the most vulnerable victims.
The proposition is tempting because the egalitarian goals are
worthy. Bias crime legislation is indeed justifiable on retributivist grounds,
and the interests of crime victims indeed deserve great attention, by
retributivists as well as utilitarians. But, I will argue, the suggestion is
largely unnecessary and potentially dangerous. It is largely unnecessary
because the authors understate the ability of the retributive paradigm to
encompass egalitarian concerns, including the protection of especially
vulnerable victims. Yet it is potentially dangerous. Insofar as a particular
form of egalitarianism does permit, or even requires, that the defendant’s
blameworthiness be ignored, that egalitarian demand is in conflict with
retributive values. To be sure, the state has a duty to promote egalitarian
goals, and has many legitimate means for doing so. But sometimes we
must decline to pursue these goals through the instrument of criminal law,
if we care about giving offenders their just deserts.

I.

Summary of the Harel/Parchomovksy argument

The authors correctly observe that contemporary criminal law
discourse embodies a “wrongfulness-culpability hypothesis” (hereinafter
WC).3

Under WC, criminal sanctions require that a defendant has

culpably brought about a wrong; and increased sanctions are warranted,
ceteris paribus, only if the defendant has acted more culpably, or has
brought about a greater wrong. These features of WC, they note, are
consistent with retributivist and other non-utilitarian approaches to

3

Id. at 508.
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punishment.4
But WC is deficient, the authors assert, and must be supplemented
by a “fair protection” paradigm (FPP).5 WC is deficient because it gives no
independent weight to the interests of a victim. In particular, WC ignores
the special vulnerability of certain victims. Consider (this is my example)
the elderly. Suppose we conclude that they are especially likely to be
crime victims (they are “high-risk” in the authors’ terms), or that they are
likely to suffer especially severe harm if they are the victims of a crime like
assault (they are “extra-sensitive”).6 WC cannot justify imposing a more
serious penalty on a person who attacks an elderly victim.

For “no

particular offender is responsible for the fact that the victim was
particularly susceptible to crime due to the disposition of other criminals to
prey on her.”7
However, if WC is supplemented by FPP, then (the authors argue)
a greater sanction for such an attacker can indeed be justified—by the
victim’s greater need for protection. FPP expresses the egalitarian notion
that protection from crime is a good produced by the criminal law, and the
state has a duty to distribute this good fairly. Specifically, the state should
make special efforts to reduce crime against those who are especially
vulnerable

4

due

to

immutable

personal characteristics.8

Greater

Id. at 508 (“[WC] dominates the non-utilitarian discourse of criminal law”); 520 (“[WC]

cannot accommodate utilitarian theories of punishment.”).
5

Id. at 509.

6

Id. at 510.

7

Id. at 521.

8

The FPP might also be interpreted as requiring the state to give priority to the needs of

the most vulnerable. As the authors note, id. at 523-524, such a priority approach is not
the same as a purely egalitarian approach to vulnerability. Under the latter, the state’s
ultimate duty is to equalize vulnerability, either by “leveling up” so that no citizens are
more vulnerable than the most secure citizens, or even by “leveling down” the most
secure citizens. But under a priority approach, the state is obliged to help out only those
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enforcement of the criminal law against those who victimize the most
vulnerable citizens is one way for the state to discharge this duty. But
when this is not feasible, the state should impose harsher sanctions.
In the course of this argument, the authors offer some provocative
criticisms of WC, and also provide an interesting taxonomy of the types of
vulnerability that they believe the state should address and the types it
should not.9 But I believe that the argument as a whole is unpersuasive.
Before I provide a general criticism, it will be helpful to consider whether
the argument achieves the narrower goal of providing an attractive
justification of bias crimes. Even in this narrower context, I believe, the
argument fails.

II.

Internal critique: Does FPP justify bias crime legislation?

The authors claim that the usual rationales within WC theory cannot
justify bias crimes, and I respond to that claim later in this essay. But this
is not the most original part of their argument.10 Rather, the authors’ most
who are the most vulnerable to crime.

The purely egalitarian approach to general

vulnerability is obviously problematic. Should the state take steps to prevent the wealthy
from providing themselves a degree of security that the state cannot afford to provide the
rest of society?

Should it provide lower penalties than would otherwise be justified

whenever the victim is a wealthy person who is relatively invulnerable to crime?
On the other hand, a purely egalitarian approach to vulnerability is much more
plausible in the narrower context of racially-based violence. That is, even if certain racial
groups are much more at risk from such violence than others, we might choose not to
give priority to their needs. Rather, a neutral bias crime statute that imposes the same
punishment supplement for crimes against any group expresses the egalitarian value that
racial bias is socially divisive and especially culpable.
9

See “On Hate and Equality,” at 524-529, 535-536.

10

I do, however, find many of their arguments on this point to be rather ad hoc and

unpersuasive. For a recent defense of bias crime legislation that addresses many of their
arguments, see Frederick Lawrence, Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes under American Law
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interesting assertion is that FPP is an especially promising rationale for
bias crime legislation. In their view, such legislation responds to the fact
that racial and other groups protected by such legislation are unusually
vulnerable to crime. To compensate for that extra vulnerability, we need
to impose a stronger sanction against those who select persons to be
victims based on racial criteria and similar immutable characteristics.
The argument that FPP justifies higher sanctions for bias crimes
has some initial plausibility. The authors are correct to point out that bias
crimes often do contribute to the special vulnerability of the group
members subject to bias. Obviously, other things being equal, if crimes
committed on the basis of race suddenly ceased to occur, members of
such victimized racial groups would be less vulnerable to crime.
But bias crime enhancement is not principally designed to
compensate for this extra vulnerability. If it were, one would expect to see
relatively widespread enactment of similar penalty enhancement laws for
other vulnerable groups—the elderly, children, prison inmates, the
hospitalized, the mentally ill, and so forth. No such widespread pattern
exists.11 Moreover, many of these other groups are much more vulnerable

(1999); see also Andrew Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of
Hate Crimes Legislation are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 739 (1999); Carol S. Steiker,
Punishing Hateful Motives: Old Wine in a New Bottle Revives Calls for Prohibition, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 1857 (1999).
11

To be sure, special duties are often imposed in some of these situations. In many

jurisdictions, for example, lack of consent to rape is conclusively presumed (or is deemed
morally irrelevant) for certain classes of vulnerable victims, including children and those
with mental disabilities. But this type of example is better understood as expressing a
uniform criterion of criminal liability for a particular offense (i.e., requiring mature, knowing
consent) than as evidencing an independent concern with general vulnerability to crime.
Criminal laws prohibiting the abuse of children, and heightened penalties for
committing crimes against children, do show a genuine concern with vulnerability, at least
in the “extrasensitive” sense. Of course, it is also quite plausible to conclude that the
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to crime (in either the “high-risk” or “extrasensitive” sense, or both) than
are the racial and other groups usually covered by bias crime legislation.
Furthermore, the additional vulnerability to crime due to bias crimes
surely pales in comparison with additional vulnerability to crime due to
geography, wealth, class, and similar factors. Moving away from a violent
inner city neighborhood will reduce vulnerability to crime far more than
changing the color of one’s skin will.12 Indeed, if unequal vulnerability to
crime is the overriding social problem that the authors suggest, the best
and most direct governmental response would involve the following
process: carefully collect statistical data about the incidence of crime on
various groups; determine which factors (age, physical and mental health,
poverty, urban versus nonurban location, large versus small city, gender,
race, and so forth) have what degree of independent statistical
significance; and then prioritize efforts (via higher sanctions or greater
enforcement) to diminish vulnerability according to the relative significance
of these factors.

Whatever the merits of this approach, it is not the

approach we see in contemporary substantive criminal law and criminal
enforcement policies.
Even if unusual vulnerability really were the problem that bias crime
legislation addresses, wouldn’t it make more sense to police, investigate,
and prosecute crimes committed against bias crime victims more
aggressively than to increase the sanctions for such crimes? The authors
agree that either increased sanctions or increased enforcement might be
an effective response to the unequal vulnerability of different victims, but
long-term emotional harms to a child from a given physical attack are considerably
greater than the harms from a similar attack on an adult.
12

The authors at least partially concede this point, “On Hate and Equality,” at 538, but

argue that we should still address the racial component of vulnerability separately.
However, if the additional vulnerability due to race and other criteria encompassed by
bias crime laws is insignificant relative to other forms of vulnerability that criminal law
does not address, then FPP is not a persuasive explanation for bias crime legislation.
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they suggest that increased enforcement is not likely to be an effective
strategy for bias crime victims, because “it is only after the perpetrator of
the crime is detected that one can discern her motives clearly.”13

By

contrast, they point out, special vulnerability due to poverty can more
effectively be addressed through ex ante efforts (such as policing of poor
neighborhoods) than through ex post higher sanctions.
But the greater ability to detect bias motivation ex post does not
conclusively support employing increased sanctions rather than more
aggressive prosecution. Post-crime investigation and prosecution of bias
crimes could still be pursued more aggressively. And ex ante state efforts
to prevent bias crimes by more aggressive policing are sometimes
effective.14 In short, it is an open, empirical question whether, for bias
crimes, higher sanctions are more effective than ex post enforcement
efforts.15
A simple fact remains: most Americans at the turn of the century
consider bias crimes to be especially outrageous and reprehensible, but
for reasons other than the extra vulnerability of the victim. When a black
is assaulted because of his race, a Catholic is targeted because of her
religion, or a gay person is attacked because of his sexual orientation,
13
14

Id. at 537.
In some situations, police can reliably predict a significant chance of interracial

hostility—for example, in certain neighborhoods, in connection with sporting events when
teams are primarily of different races, or following a racially charged trial, the killing of a
prominent minority leader, or the killing of an apparently innocent minority group member
by police.
15

Suppose that studies indicate that a significant proportion of assaults committed by

blacks on whites, or by whites on blacks, involve discriminatory selection. For purposes
of FPP, it might actually be more efficient for police and prosecutors to aggressively give
higher priority to all interracial crimes than to impose a higher sanction in those few cases
where discriminatory selection could be proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. (Also,
the extent to which a higher sanction will deter defendants is itself unclear, inasmuch as
unconscious motives may play a role.)
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additional moral condemnation is warranted; but the quantum of additional
condemnation that is deserved is not a direct function of the protected
group’s unusual vulnerability to crime. Race, gender, religion, and sexual
orientation are personal traits with enormous social significance. Criminal
actors who select victims on these bases do not act in a historical and
social vacuum. The moral and social significance of their acts is informed
by, and partly a function of, centuries of official and private acts of
discrimination that have disadvantaged groups along these lines.
Contemporary bias crimes reinforce the memories and effects of that
discrimination, and threaten social division. When the authors suggest
that the fundamental reason for imposing higher sanctions against those
who commit crimes out of bias is differential vulnerability, they offer a
rationale that would equally justify imposing higher sanctions against
those who victimize the emotionally sensitive, the gullible, or the physically
weak. In so doing, the authors ignore the compelling social context of bias
crimes.

III.

Retributivism and FPP

To answer the broader claim that retributivism is a deficient theory
of punishment, it is critical to examine more carefully the retributive
perspective underlying WC.

We will see that the authors greatly

underestimate the capacity of retributivism to accommodate both
egalitarian norms and norms protecting vulnerable victims. At the same
time, they are correct that that capacity is not unlimited. However, I will
argue that the limits which retributivism does place upon the incorporation
of broad egalitarian goals within criminal law are a virtue, not a vice.
Criminal law is a distinctive legal institution.

When the state

imposes criminal sanctions, it deprives the offender of property or liberty,
and it accompanies that deprivation with a solemn moral condemnation.
The state must have a powerful justification for these practices.
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Retributivists claim that they (in contrast, especially, with utilitarians) can
provide such a justification, premised upon the offender’s serious,
culpable and unjustified breach of legitimate social norms.
A retributive perspective is backward-looking, assessing an actor’s
just deserts according to his culpability in causing a wrong and according
to the wrong he has caused or risked.16 Different retributive theories differ
in how they define and grade both culpability and wrong. They differ in the
roles they would assign to different legal actors in defining criminal law
norms, in applying them, and in choosing an appropriate sanction or
sentence. But they will ordinarily agree in requiring minimal culpability (for
example, negligence), a minimum level of wrongdoing (i.e., a threshold of
what may legitimately be criminalized), proportionality (punishment should
not be excessive in relation to culpability and wrongdoing), and some
appropriate relationship between culpability and wrongdoing (negligently
causing death is less blameworthy than intentionally causing death, but it
might or might not be less blameworthy than intentionally causing a
broken arm).
Can a retributive perspective accommodate egalitarian norms and
norms protecting the especially vulnerable, either in its standards of
culpability or in its standards of wrongdoing?

Indeed it can.

Before

explaining how this is possible, however, I need to address a more basic
point.
16

Culpability is ordinarily understood to encompass mental states, excuses, and degree

of responsibility, while wrongdoing encompasses the harm or wrong, causation, and
issues of justification. There are different ways of drawing the distinction, see, e.g.,
George Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law 74-92 (1998) (distinguishing attribution
from wrongdoing); Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical
Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1015, 1024-1036 (1997)
(distinguishing culpability from wrongdoing); Heidi Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence,
76 B.U. L. Rev. 249 (1996) (distinguishing culpability from wrongfulness in tort and
criminal law). But for purposes of this essay, the differences are not significant.
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Equality norms: Consequentialist or retributivist?

Given their explanation of FPP, it is clear that the authors
understand egalitarian norms as consequentialist. They are concerned, in
other words, with ensuring that the criminal law, in its content and
enforcement, will promote egalitarian consequences—specifically, the
consequence of fairly distributing to potential victims the “good” of
protection from crimes. At the same time, they (correctly) understand WC
to be essentially a retributivist, nonconsequentialist perspective.17
Accordingly, an initial puzzle about their analysis is, to put it bluntly,
why they bother.
accommodate FPP,

Why would the authors even expect WC to
so understood?

After all,

retributivist

and

consequentialist perspectives very often conflict; and the conflict of WC
and FPP would be just one more example of such a conflict. (By contrast,
if WC were understood to be part of a more general consequentialist
theory—for example, if a largely utilitarian account were given of WC18—
then FPP need not create a conflict; for the equality that it requires could
simply be one more value to be promoted, along with utility, in an overall
17

On the consequentialist character of FPP, see “On Hate and Equality,” at 529

(imposition of harsher sanctions through the FPP is “intended … to equalize the
distribution of protection by deterring offenders from committing crimes against certain
victims.”); 510-511. On the retributivist character of WC, see id. at 508, 520.
18

This is not just a theoretical possibility. In his recent work, Paul Robinson argues that

the criminal law should, for utilitarian reasons, attempt to conform to lay intuitions about
just deserts. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame:
Community Views and the Criminal Law (1995); Paul H. Robinson, Testing Lay Intuitions
of Justice: How and Why?, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 611 (2000).

For two critiques, see

Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substantive
Criminal Law, 87 J. Crim. Law & Criminol. 315, 316-321 (1996); Kenneth W. Simons, The
Relevance of Community Values to Just Deserts: Criminal Law, Punishment Rationales,
and Democracy, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 636 (2000).
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consequentialist analysis.)
But perhaps FPP poses a genuine challenge to retributivism
because it is reasonable to expect retributivist critics of utilitarianism—or
at least liberal retributivists—to support egalitarian norms as well. I agree
that such an expectation is reasonable. Where I differ with the authors,
however, is in their apparent view that retributivism itself cannot
incorporate egalitarian norms.
In the next two sections, I will give examples of such incorporation.
For the moment, however, it is worth clarifying in general terms how the
role of egalitarian norms differs under consequentialist theories (such as
FPP) as opposed to nonconsequentialist theories (such as retributivism).19
The consequentialist interpretation is clear enough: under FPP and similar
principles, the point of criminal punishment is to promote equality of
protection from crime. The retributive interpretation is different: the point
of criminal punishment is to accord an offender his just deserts, and
egalitarian norms figure in as a relevant aspect of just deserts. But, since
the reason for punishment is to impose a sanction proportional to the
culpability that the offender displayed and the wrongdoing that he
committed in a past act, it is irrelevant (on a pure retributive view) whether
the infliction of punishment promotes any further beneficial egalitarian
consequences.

Put differently, retributivism does insist that the

punishment actually imposed be appropriately tailored to the offender’s
just deserts, and egalitarian values (as we shall see) can be relevant both
to an actor’s demonstrated culpability and to his wrongdoing.

19

But

For some discussions, see Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 Ratio 202 (1997)

(explaining the distinction between teleological and deontological equality); Philip Pettit,

The Contribution of Analytic Philosophy, from A Companion to Contemporary
Political Philosophy (Goodin & Pettit eds. 1993) (explaining the distinction between
promoting and honoring a value such as equality).
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retributivism does not consider the possible beneficial consequences
(egalitarian or otherwise) of punishment that lie further in the future.
Consider an example. A criminal prohibition of lynching would, in
the American historical context, clearly be designed to address raciallymotivated brutality that also constitutes an interference with the judicial
process. Such a prohibition could reflect either or both interpretations of
equality.

On a purely consequentialist interpretation, it reflects a

legislative intention to prevent future lynchings and thus to prevent both
serious individual harms and the perpetuation of racial prejudice and racial
division. On a purely retributive interpretation, punishment is not justified
by, nor calibrated to, its expected efficacy in preventing future lynchings.
Rather, without regard to such effects or to the relative efficacy of other
social controls in preventing lynchings, a retributivist can justify especially
harsh punishment of such an offender because he has made a highly
culpable and wrongful choice to seriously harm the victim, to interfere with
the victim’s equality rights, and to inflame racial tensions in the
community.20
The authors briefly mention the possibility that egalitarian norms
could be part of WC. In their view, however, incorporating fair protection
into WC “would radically transform the [WC] paradigm” and “would require
an expansion of the concept of wrongfulness far beyond its traditional
boundaries.”21 In the next sections, I will take issue with this view. We will
see that WC can indeed accommodate egalitarian norms, including norms
responding to the “fair protection” concerns that (according to the authors)
only FPP can adequately address. Moreover, WC can also accommodate
a distinctive concern about the special culpability and wrongfulness of
20

In this essay, for purposes of clarity, I consider only the implications of a pure

retributive approach, not a “mixed” approach that includes both retributive and
consequentialist components.
21

“On Hate and Equality,” at 522.
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harming the vulnerable, a concern that is not always grounded in
egalitarian values.

B.

Retributivism and culpability

Can a retributivist justify imposing a greater penalty on a criminal
offender who preys on the vulnerable, based on the offender’s greater
culpability?

Can retributivist culpability principles also incorporate

egalitarian norms? In each case, yes. Holding constant the degree of
wrongdoing, it is sometimes more culpable to take advantage of the
vulnerable or to act on reasons that violate egalitarian norms.
With respect to vulnerability, consider an example from the law of
homicide. In People v. Poplis,22 defendant repeatedly beat a three year
old child over a course of six days, resulting in the child’s death.

In

deciding that the proof was sufficient to permit a conviction of “depraved
indifference” murder, the court emphasized that the “continued brutality to
a child” helped establish a “graver culpability” than would be displayed in a
merely reckless killing.23

It seems clear that the helplessness and

vulnerability of the child are factors that the jury may legitimately consider
in evaluating the defendant’s culpability.24 And a retributivist rationale,
focusing on the offender’s extraordinary callousness and malevolent
character, can support this legal rule.
The authors do consider the view that “crime directed at high-risk
victims is morally worse than crime directed at low-risk victims,” because
such a crime, by preying on one who lacks a fair opportunity to defend

22

30 N.Y. 2d 85, 281 N. E. 2d 167 (1972).

23

Id. at 88. A reckless killing that did not demonstrate “depraved indifference” would be

classified as manslaughter, not murder.
24

In the authors’ terms, a child is both “high-risk”—she has special difficulty warding off

an attack—and “extrasensitive”—she is more likely to suffer injury if attacked.
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herself, violates the principle of fair play. “But,” they reply, “this view is
premised on an analogy between criminality and sportsmanship—a
dubious analogy, at best.”25

Their brief analysis of the reasons why

preying on the vulnerable is especially culpable is unconvincing.

The

appropriate question is not whether a victim has been offered a “fair
chance” at self-defense—as if the offender owes, not just a primary duty
not to commit a crime, but also a secondary duty to give the victim a
“sporting chance” to fight back.26 Rather, an actor’s willingness to exploit
vulnerability often reveals an especially heinous disregard for the
humanity of others, as the criminal law recognizes.27
Thus far, I have argued that one who exploits vulnerability in
causing a harm or wrong can justifiably be considered more culpable than
one who does not.

This argument does not essentially rely on any

egalitarian norms. However, egalitarian concerns do underlie a principal
argument in favor of bias crime legislation—that the special culpability of a
prejudiced actor justifies a higher penalty, apart from whether the actor

25

Id. at 530-531.

26

Recall the comic book convention by which the villain who has captured the superhero

inevitably gives his captive ample opportunity to make a courageous escape, a
convention explored with acumen in the recent film, Austin Powers, International Man of
Mystery (New Line Productions Inc. 1997).
27

Death penalty statutes are another context in which criminal law culpability principles in

fact consider exploitation of vulnerability. Such statutes often include as an aggravating
circumstance that the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel,” and some
explicitly include exploitation of the vulnerability of children or the elderly as a distinct
category.

See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-703 (F)(9) (1999) (aggravating

circumstance that victim was under fifteen or over sixty-nine years of age): Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §16-11-103(5)(m) (2000) (aggravating circumstance that victim was under
twelve years of age). Some states also count as an aggravating factor the victim’s status
as a kidnap victim, a hostage, or a shield. Richard J. Bonnie, Anne M. Coughlin, John C.
Jeffries, Jr., & Peter W. Low, Criminal Law 703 (Foundation Press 1997).
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brings about a greater harm.28 I will not add much to this argument here,
except by way of brief response to two of the authors’ points.
First,

the

authors

object

that

motives

for

crimes

are

incommensurable: even if racism and similar forms of prejudice are
blameworthy, how can we assess their significance relative to other
motives like pecuniary gain or sadism?29 The comparability problem here
is indeed nontrivial.

However, so is the more general problem of

comparing the significance of different types of wrongdoing or harm (under
either a retributive or utilitarian theory).

Which is the greater wrong,

destroying a building by arson, defrauding a business (of how much?),
stealing property from the person of another (how much property?), or
causing a person physical harm (how much harm?)? Yet the difficulty of
drawing uncontroversial distinctions in wrongdoing does not cause us to
question that enterprise itself.
Second, the authors suggest that FPP explains aspects of bias
crime laws that WC and retributive theory cannot explain. Specifically,
some bias crime laws omit a racial animus requirement, and instead only
require that the defendant selected the victim on the basis of the victim’s
race.

WC cannot explain, they say, why one who lacks the special

culpability of racial animus or hostility still deserves a higher sanction.30
This is a valid point. A retributivist perspective that focuses on the
defendant’s culpability does have more difficulty justifying racial selection
statutes than racial animus statutes. As I suggest below (in discussing the
“Ignorant Initiate” example), any interpretation of a racial selection statute
that completely ignores culpability would violate liberal retributive

28

Lawrence, supra note 10=, at 58-61; Taslitz, supra note 10=, passim; Steiker, supra

note 10=, at 1863-1870 (emphasizing that a variety of motives have independent
significance in aggravating deserved criminal punishment).
29

“On Hate and Equality,” at 513.

30

Id. at 533.
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principles. Still, an offender who selects a victim because of race clearly
displays some blameworthiness. Suppose an individual selects whites to
rob only because he believes that they usually have more money.31
Nevertheless, he deserves at least some blame for his knowing decision
to subject one racial group to special risks. Crimes against the elderly
illustrate the point even more clearly. One who victimizes the elderly is
likely to have no special animus towards them; his motive is simply to
obtain criminal benefits more easily. Still, so long as the offender knows
that the person he is victimizing is a member of a racial group, or a
member of a vulnerable class such as the elderly, he does display greater
culpability than an offender who unknowingly causes harm to a person in
that class without any such culpability.32
Moreover, a person who lacks animus but selects a victim on the
basis of race or age ordinarily shows culpable indifference to the person’s
interests—in other words, a much greater willingness to harm such a
person than to harm a person of his own race or group. This attitude of
disrespect can be almost as blameworthy as hostility or animus.33
31

Lawrence, supra note 10=, at 30.

32

I have been discussing forms of retributivism in which the actor’s just deserts depends

on his level of culpability. However, a retributive view that gives independent weight to
the harm caused could analyze selection statutes somewhat differently. Harm-based
retributivists support strict liability in the grading of crimes, and support punishing all
attempts less seriously than the corresponding completed crime. On such a view, an
offender D1 who assaults V1 on the basis of race deserves greater punishment than an
offender D2 who assaults V2 (but not on such a basis), where “on the basis of race”
means only that the race of the victim somehow plays a role in causing a greater harm or
wrong, not that the offender was more culpable.

(Consider the “Ignorant Initiate”

example, below.)
But harm-based retributivism is controversial. And in this context, it would have
the far-reaching consequence of justifying higher penalties in every interracial, interethnic
and interreligious crime.
33

See R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency, and Criminal Liability, ch. 7 (1990); Kenneth W.

Page 17 of 38

On Equality, Bias Crimes, and Just Deserts

Concededly, it might be preferable for bias crime laws to employ a
narrower racial animus criterion, for reasons of fair notice and
administrability,34 but in principle it would be consistent with retributive
theory also to impose liability based on a weaker criterion of culpable
indifference.
Finally, egalitarian values other than the more obvious ones
implicated in bias crimes can also inform a judgment of culpability. One
interesting example is where an offender selects a victim for a random,
inexplicable reason. In a famous example, Sir James Fitsgames Stephen
suggests that a person who impulsively pushes a stranger off a bridge to
his death is as heinous as a premeditated murderer.35

The very

randomness and senselessness of the act bespeak a special depravity.
More generally, many “depraved indifference” murder cases involve
people who kill victims randomly. (Common examples are shooting a gun
into an occupied house or vehicle.) It would be consistent with retributive
norms for a court to find that an offender’s decision to endanger a random
victim is a factor militating in favor of murder liability.36
Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal Negligence, 5 J.
Contemp. L. Issues 365, 388-393 (1994); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, The Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1989).
34

See Lawrence, supra note 10=, at 76.

35

Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, 3 A History of the Criminal Law of England 94 (1884).

36

Of course, insofar as random selection of victims is a more widespread social

phenomenon, it can cause considerable public insecurity. In such a case, the insecurity
is an additional harm and thus warrants a higher penalty because of the act’s greater
wrongfulness, not just its greater culpability. The recent spate of random shootings of
drivers on California highways is an example.
One might object that “random” or “arbitrary” selection methods don’t present
equality problems at all, insofar as possible victims are selected by lottery, which is a kind
of ex ante equality. But I disagree. Whether random selection methods satisfy or violate
egalitarian norms depends on the context. See Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and
Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 447, 524-527 (1989) (discussing the
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Retributivism and wrongdoing

To what extent can retributivism accommodate concerns about
equality and vulnerability in its specification and grading of wrongdoing
(holding constant the degree of culpability)?37 To a considerable extent,
as

we

shall

see;

accordingly,

the

need

for

an

independent,

consequentialist FPP is considerably less than the authors believe.
Retributive theory is able to accommodate a number of different
substantive conceptions of wrongdoing, including violation of egalitarian
norms and norms protecting the vulnerable. Physical harm to persons is
the core type of wrongdoing addressed by the criminal law, but economic
treatment of “nonrational” classification under equal protection law).

In the present

context, a random act of violence often reveals an unusual insensitivity to human welfare.
Moreover, a coherent explanation of a killing based on the actor’s relationship to the
victim can sometimes at least partly mitigate punishment, while a randomly directed
killing is much less likely to seem understandable.
37

Formally, bias crimes incorporate egalitarian norms as a mental state element of a

crime, not as an actus reus element. To be guilty of a bias crime, one must act out of
racial or other prohibited animus, or must select the victim on a prohibited basis. So it
might seem that a retributivist justification of higher penalties for bias crimes must turn on
the heightened culpability of a bias criminal (as expressed in this additional mental state
element), not on his committing a more wrongful act or bringing about a greater harm.
But this formal focus is too narrow. It is legitimate to base an ultimate justification of bias
crimes on the greater wrongdoing or harm that such crimes express or bring about (as
measured by actual affront to egalitarian values), rather than on their greater culpability
(as measured by the actor’s attitude towards, or choice to bring about, that effect), even
though as a formal matter, the state need not prove in any individual case that the crime
implicated additional individual or social harms.
For a helpful discussion of the distinction between wrongfulness and culpability,
and an acknowledgement that the distinction is not precisely coextensive with the
criminal law distinction between actus reus and mens rea, see Dillof, supra note 16=, at
1024-1036.
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harms, emotional harms, harms to the legal system, harms to national
security, and myriad other harms or wrongs can also be included.38
In many instances, the criminal “wrong” consists entirely in the
violation of an egalitarian norm—for example, intentional interference with
voting rights on the basis of race, or willful violation of laws against
discrimination in employment, housing, or public accommodation. In the
context of bias crimes, when prejudice or racial animosity lies behind a
crime, the crime can cause additional harm both to the victim and to
others, including the wider society.
The authors downplay the harm that prejudice causes to the victim,
asserting that the only real harm is the physical or other injury caused by
the crime. Discriminatory treatment, they claim, “does not exacerbate the
wrong committed by the perpetrator.”39 Moreover, to conclude otherwise,
they believe, is to give the victim a “protectable interest in the perpetrator’s
thoughts.”40 But the claim that the harm from discrimination is exhausted
by the harm that nondiscriminatory treatment would produce is quite
implausible. Presumably their reason for supporting FPP in the first place
is to endorse the equality rights of victims.

The additional harm that

violation of such equality rights adds to the criminal act might be less

38

To be sure, some retributive theories will not be so pluralistic, and will be more

restrictive in what may count as a “wrong.” However, the authors’ argument is more
general, so I think I am being fair in treating them as concluding that no retributive
account can accommodate FPP.
Interestingly enough, the authors note that to employ their own criterion of
“vulnerability” in applying FPP, they must identify the “magnitude of the harm,” and they
concede that this “is often a vague concept. The harm may involve a violation of the
dignitary interests of the victim or the violation of her autonomy, and any evaluation of the
magnitude of these harms is inevitably controversial.” Id. at 527.
39

Id. at 515.

40

Id. at 516, relying on Dillof, supra note 16=, at 1039-1040.
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tangible, but that does not render it unreal.41

Nor does this analysis

presuppose that the victim has an “interest in the perpetrator’s thoughts,”
any more than a race discrimination or sex discrimination victim in a
noncriminal case is concerned with free-floating thoughts that the
perpetrator does not act upon.42
The authors are also skeptical that bias crimes cause any
distinctive harm to the wider society. But their skepticism is a result of
defining

that

harm

in

race-neutral

terms

(generalized

harm

to

communities; precipitation of further violence), and then observing that
bias crimes are not as distinctive as claimed in causing such harms.
These doubts are unwarranted once we notice that the distinctive features
of bias crimes can exacerbate racial division in the wider society.43
41

See Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 387, 431-433 (1985).

Moreover, for evidence that the additional injury caused by bias includes significant
emotional and psychological effects, as well as harms to the community, see Lawrence,
supra note 10=, at 40-44.
42

Perhaps the authors believe that while FPP imposes a duty on the state to equalize

protection, it does not imply any correlative equality right on the part of the victim.
Although this is a coherent position, it is a surprising one, in light of the authors’ pervasive
complaint that WC is seriously inadequate relative to FPP in the protection it affords to
victims.

This position also seems to have the troubling implication that civil

antidiscrimination laws that give full-fledged enforceable rights to victims (including
injunctive and damage remedies) are unjustifiable.
43

A similar blindness seems to underly their dubious explanation for why bias crime laws

neutrally protect all races and religions. This feature of bias crimes is a puzzle for the
authors and for their “vulnerability” explanation of such crimes, insofar as racial and
religious majorities are much less vulnerable to crime than minorities are. See “On Hate
and Equality,” at 535-536. In explanation, they assert that racial prejudices are likely to
change over time (by comparison, for example, with the explicit protection of the
vulnerable under sentencing guidelines); thus, the neutral language protecting all groups
“ensures that the group most in need of greater protection at any given time will actually
receive it.” Id. at 532. But a much more straightforward and plausible explanation for this
symmetrical coverage is that a bias crime by a minority group member against a majority
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Thus, egalitarian norms are among the social norms that can
justifiably warrant a retributive response when they are culpably violated. I
have mentioned some of the more obvious examples of such egalitarian
norms—such as criminally enforced antidiscrimination laws.

Less

obvious, perhaps, are concerns about the discriminatory enforcement and
effect of criminal laws that, on their face, appear to be fair. A pluralist
retributivism can also accommodate such concerns in its specification and
grading of wrongdoing.44
group member still can inflame community racial tensions, even though majority group
members might not be especially vulnerable to crime.
44

Consider three examples.

First, the death penalty, as applied, will predictably be

imposed disproportionately against blacks, and disproportionately against criminals
whose victims are white. That discriminatory impact counts as a strong reason against
enforcing the death penalty at all. Second, the doctrine of provocation might unjustifiably
favor male “passion” killers relative to female killers, for a number of reasons: modern
flexible approaches permit sexist views about gender roles to control; traditional
approaches give categorical weight to factors, such as adultery, which disproportionately
excuse men; and the requirement that the killing occur “in the heat of passion,” soon after
the provocation, discriminates against women, who often explode into violence only after
a long period of simmering emotions. -simmering internal debate= exprewho more often
use violence instrumentally as a means of control over others, relative to women, who
more often explode suddenly out of frustration. See Samuel Pillsbury, Judging Evil:
Rethinking the Law of Murder and Manslaughter 147-155 (1998). If these claims are
true, then the differential is a reason to consider reformulating, or even eliminating, the
doctrine. Third, if the state’s own laxity in enforcing domestic abuse laws and in providing
shelters for battered women is significantly responsible for the plight of such women,
perhaps the state should relax the application of criminal law doctrines that would
otherwise preclude a woman from successfully claiming self-defense when she assaults
or kills her abuser.
Moreover, the form of substantive criminal law norms often is, in part, a response
to egalitarian concerns. Rules might be chosen over flexible standards for this reason.
Conversely, more individualized tests (relativizing the reasonable person standard, for
example) can be understood as equalizing the criminal law’s treatment of each person to
accord with her actual ability.

(The young need only conform to the standard of a
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Indeed, the authors’ approach, as it stands, is in one respect less
egalitarian than some retributivist approaches. For the authors focus on
fairly distributing protection from “crimes”; they do not discuss how the
content of crimes should itself be defined and justified. But in a society
committed to equality, that content should itself reflect egalitarian values.
If, for example, the crime of rape is punished leniently relative to other
types of physical assault, or if it is defined very narrowly, then one might
justifiably complain that the criminal law fails to treat the interests of
women as seriously as the interests of men.
Now let us turn to the question whether a retributive conception of
wrongdoing can accommodate concerns about special vulnerability.
Specifically, consider the question whether assaulting an elderly person,
or a child, can legitimately be considered a more serious wrong than
assaulting a non-elderly adult, consistent with retributive norms.45 And
reasonable young person, the disabled to the standard of a reasonable disabled person,
and so on.) Much obviously depends on which particular egalitarian value we endorse.
The authors do not explore these egalitarian norms. The norm they do defend,
FCC, is not inconsistent with them. But the authors do not acknowledge that there are
many ways, within the retributivist paradigm, to implement a broad range of egalitarian
values.
45

My example is an enhancement statute. Legislatures have enhanced penalties for

assault on a wide variety of types of victims—not only the young and the elderly, and not
only police officers, but also firefighters, school employees, judges, jurors, emergency
medical personnel, the disabled, and even coaches at athletic events. See Richard J.
Singer, The Model Penal Code and Three Ways Courts Avoid Mens Rea, 4 Buffalo
Criminal Law Review __ (forthcoming), at 37-38 (unpublished draft).
One could also imagine a statute under which victim status is the criterion that
converts noncriminal into criminal behavior.

(Suppose a jurisdiction criminalizes

intentionally causing serious emotional distress to a child or elderly person, but not
intentionally causing such distress to a nonelderly adult.)
Under harm-based retributivism, culpability need not be required as to bringing
about the greater harm. Under a more restricted form of harm-based retributivism that
only requires culpability as to some harm or wrong, but permits enhancement if the harm
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assume that the very reason for considering these types of assaults to be
more serious is the reason expressed in FPP: these groups are especially
vulnerable, and an otherwise similar crime inflicted upon them is more
serious than such a crime inflicted on a young adult.
I do not see why retributivism cannot count harm to the especially
vulnerable as a form of aggravated wrongdoing—so long as culpability as
to that wrong is also required.

One who intentionally, knowingly,

recklessly, or even negligently takes advantage of a more vulnerable
person can be, for that reason, more deserving of blame than one who
commits an otherwise identical crime against a person lacking that
vulnerability.
But is this argument circular? The authors believe that FPP best
explains why we would sometimes want to treat differently two people who
commit the same criminal act: FPP can explain why an assault against a
vulnerable person should receive more punishment than the same assault
against a nonvulnerable person, while WC cannot. And the authors might
object that I have arbitrarily redefined “the same criminal act,” calling an
assault against a vulnerable person “a more serious criminal act” than an
assault against a nonvulnerable person, but ignoring the fact that each is
really just an assault.
Yet there is nothing arbitrary about defining criminal wrongs
differently based on such circumstances as the vulnerability, social role, or
identity of the victim. It is just not true that an assault is an assault. Only
a very narrow and implausible criminal law theory would consider all
assaults the same.

Rather, the state may justifiably view an assault

caused is greater than that culpably risked or intended, it would be permissible to
enhance punishment for an assault on a police officer or an elderly person even if the
actor was unaware of the victim’s status, but not permissible to convert a noncriminal into
a criminal act absent such culpability. Many courts do permit enhancement based on
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(however defined) on a police officer, a witness, a prison guard, a judge, a
President, or a child, as a more serious wrong, for a number of good
reasons, consistent with retributivism (as well as other criminal law
theories). For, in addition to the physical harm to the immediate victim,
such an assault implicates broader social interests, such as public security
or the integrity of the trial process.46
Another straightforward example of how vulnerability is a relevant
aspect of wrongdoing is the crime of bank robbery, which is often
punished more severely than robbery of other commercial establishments.
Why? Presumably not simply because the expected value of the loss is
larger (a factor that could easily be addressed by grading the punishment
according to the amount stolen), but also because the ready availability of
money in banks makes them tempting and frequent robbery targets.
(When asked why he robbed banks, Willie Sutton is said to have
answered, “Because that’s where the money is.”47)
Similarly, to a retributivist it is relevant whether a particular type of
crime has become more attractive or prevalent.

For example, certain

types of drug use are more common and attractive today, and that is a
reason for punishing distribution of such goods more harshly.48 (Likewise,
victim’s status even absent a finding of culpability as to that element. See Singer, id. at
38-40.
46

To be sure, one could imagine a retributive theory with an extremely narrow criterion of

wrongdoing, a criterion that defined harms and wrongs to human interests according to a
simple, uniform standard (such as serious interference with physical functioning). But
such a theory would be wildly inconsistent with any contemporary system of criminal law;
it would embrace homicide and assault, perhaps, but could not even explain the harm of
rape, not to mention serious non-physical harms, harms to property interests, nonindividuated harms to social interests, and the like.
47

For discussion of whether Sutton actually made the famous statement attributed to

him, see: http://www.banking.com/aba/profile_0397.htm.
48

In the debate over whether the large differential in punishment for distributing crack-

cocaine versus powder-cocaine can be justified, it is certainly relevant (if true) that young
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assaulting a police officer can deserve a higher penalty than assaulting a
private citizen, for the first type of assault undermines public respect for
law and increases public fear and insecurity by reducing public protection
against crime.)
With respect to both bank robbery and drug offenses, the
seriousness of the harm depends not just on the amount of economic or
physical harm that the offender personally causes in an individual case,
but also on the acts of others—specifically, the risk that others will also
find the crime an attractive option. Only an extremely cramped view of
“wrongdoing” would ignore such factors. Offenders act in a social setting.
The significance of any particular criminal act depends in part on the acts
of other offenders, other victims, and other persons.

And the state is

entitled to consider this broader significance in criminalizing and grading
wrongs.
A good example of how retributive theory can take vulnerability into
account is the crime of rape.
women.

Almost all rapes are committed against

The threat of rape significantly contributes to the greater

vulnerability that many women feel when they are alone in public spaces.
Accordingly, rape can legitimately be considered a more serious crime
than an otherwise comparable attack on a person’s physical safety and
integrity. Concededly, this proposition is difficult to test, insofar as it very
difficult to compare the severity of rape with the severity of other
intentional physical harms and invasions with quite different objective
people are significantly more likely to use or distribute crack cocaine.

See U.S.

Sentencing Commission, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal
Sentencing Policy (1997) (supporting some differential, though not the 100-1 ratio in
current law, based on such findings as these: crack cocaine is more often associated with
violent street crime related
to its marketing and distribution; it is more widely available on the street; and it is more
affordable, and thus “is particularly appealing and accessible to the most vulnerable
members of our society”).
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characteristics. Still, in principle, even if we believed that a rape was a
somewhat less serious wrong than, say, an intentional wounding causing
serious bodily injury, the egalitarian concern about women’s vulnerability
could justify punishing rape with a penalty as high or higher.
The authors appear to assume that WC cannot accommodate
these broader concerns. Thus, they assert that WC can only
accommodate reasons that are “intrinsic to the criminal encounter.”49 And
they suppose that WC cannot explain why I might have weightier reasons
to protect my child than to protect someone else’s child, since “[h]arming
my child is not more wrongful than harming someone else’s child.”50 But
retributive theorists need not, and indeed characteristically do not,
endorse an agent-neutral view of responsibility.

To the contrary, one

common critique of utilitarian theories, a critique typically offered on behalf
of deontological theories like retributivism, is that utilitarians cannot make
sense of agent-relative duties.51 Retributivists can provide an account of
duties (for example, duties of affirmative action) with varying scopes
depending on the actor’s role responsibility.52 Moreover, in the context of
49

“On Hate and Equality,” at 509.

50

Id. at 522.

51

See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, Introduction, Consequentialism and its Critics (S. Scheffler

ed. 1988).
52

Consider the views of Robert Nozick, who endorses a retributivist view that punishment

should be proportional to “r x H,” terms that essentially correspond to culpability and
wrongfulness, respectively. In the course of explaining why H (or wrongfulness) should
encompass both “wrongs” and “harms,” Nozick defends both the view that injuring a more
vulnerable person is a greater wrong, and the view that the degree of wrongfulness
depends in part on role responsibilities:
Letting H correspond to the degree to which others are wronged, or to the
wrongness of the act, rather than to the degree of harm, fits our view that (a)
injuring helpless people or children who cannot resist and do not fully understand
what is happening is worse than a similar injury to competent adults; (b) doing an
act you have a special duty or responsibility not to do (for instance, a policeman
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necessity and self-defense, many retributivists insist on an absolute
(agent-relative) duty not to intentionally cause the death of an innocent
person, in opposition to (agent-neutral) utilitarian arguments that might
rationalize an intentional killing if such a killing would promote a net
savings of lives.53
But can retributivism really accommodate, as an aspect of
wrongdoing, the concern to protect the general public rather than just the
individual victim? Or is this actually a disguised consequentialist view?54
Here we need to recall the sometimes subtle distinction between
retributive and consequentialist perspectives. A retributivist can consider
egalitarian values, susceptibility of others to crime, and even crimeprevention concerns, as part of her definition of wrongdoing, so long as
she conceives of wrongdoing as a retrospective assessment of just
deserts. Thus, she can give weight to such crime-prevention interests as
protecting witnesses from physical harm, and accordingly can justify a
higher penalty for those who knowingly assault or kill a witness, so long as
the punishment increment is consistent with the offender’s culpability and
wrongdoing. (A similar analysis applies to those who deliberately destroy
or conceal evidence of a crime.) For similar reasons, retributivists can
justify punishing a person who knows he is dangerously close to
committing a crime as severely as one who succeeds, or a (knowing) killer

on duty using his weapon to settle a private grudge) is worse than someone
else’s doing the same act.
Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 719-720, note 85 (1981).
53

For discussions of this issue in the context of the famous “Trolley Problem” and the

“Utilitarian Surgeon,” see Leo Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains: Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud, and
Kindred Puzzles of the Law 52-59 (1996); Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Choice of
Evils, 23 Israeli L. Rev. 280, 290 (1991).
54

See “On Hate and Equality,” at 519 (“Taking other considerations [beyond those

“intrinsic to the crime itself”] into account violates the Kantian principle that the criminal
perpetrator must not be used as a means to promote social ends.”).
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who believes that he is practically certain to succeed more severely than a
(reckless) killer who believes that his likelihood of success is much less.
One final observation is in order concerning the retributive
significance of culpability and wrongfulness. I have analyzed these factors
separately, but they sometimes operate synergistically. In the bias crime
context in particular, certain types of wrongdoing are a function of
culpability.

Consider the harm of racial division, a harm invoked by

proponents of criminalizing bias crimes. Normally only actors acting with a
defined type of culpability—racial animus, or at least selection on the basis
of race—will in fact cause this harm. For unless the community views the
crime as racially biased, a crime committed by a white offender against a
black victim (or vice versa) will not exacerbate racial tensions.
Accordingly, an act accompanied by a form of culpability that in
other contexts suffices for retributive blame might not justify such blame in
the bias crime context. For example, retributivism can indeed support an
enhanced penalty for a person who “knowingly” victimizes a child or an
elderly person, even if that status was motivationally or causally irrelevant,
i.e., not a reason or basis for the offender’s decision to select that victim.
(And similarly, it can support an enhanced penalty for one who knowingly
victimizes a police officer, even if that status was not relevant to the
actor’s selection of the victim.) Yet bias crime liability for a person who
merely knows that the victim is of a different race or religion, but who
neither is motivated by this status nor selects the victim because of this
status, is ordinarily unjustifiable.

Why?

Because

it is normally very

unlikely that such a crime will exacerbate racial divisions or cause any
other cognizable harm.55
But “normally” is not “always.” In narrow circumstances, a merely
knowing victimization of a person of a different race would plausibly cause
55

And similarly, such knowledge (where the victim’s status is irrelevant to the

decision to commit a crime) does not make the offender especially culpable.
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sufficient social harm to warrant criminal punishment.

Suppose the

following context. In a particular city, most of the high schools are racially
segregated, and almost every high school basketball game in the last
several years has been followed by serious racially motivated violence.
Many of these fights have been precipitated by minor interracial assaults,
including some assaults that clearly were motivated by anger at losing a
game rather than racial animosity. In this volatile environment, the city
passes an ordinance increasing the penalty for assault in any case in
which the actor knowingly assaults a person of the opposite race.
Although it is a close question, I believe that such an enhancement is
justifiable.
In all but such extraordinary circumstances, however, it is not
legitimate to permit enhancement for a merely knowing victimization of a
person of another race, even though it is legitimate to permit enhancement
for a knowing victimization of a child or police officer (assuming in both
cases that the victim’s status is irrelevant to the decision to assault).
Moreover, this distinction underscores the inadequacy of the FPP
approach, which cannot readily explain why the situations differ. If it really
is true that the best justification for bias crime enhancement is the special
vulnerability of the victim, then in both cases, knowingly harming a person
in a vulnerable category should be sufficient culpability to warrant criminal
punishment. But it is not. And that should cause us to doubt the premise.
Much more could be said about the proper content of the
“wrongdoing” component of retributive theory. Retributivist scholars have
devoted much more attention to culpability, and the authors’ essay shows
the importance of more careful inquiry into wrongdoing as well.

I do

believe, however, that these brief comments suffice to counter their claim
that retributive theory cannot justify greater punishment in the name of
equality or protection of the vulnerable.
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When FPP and retributivism conflict

If retributivism and the associated WC approach can accommodate
concerns about equality and vulnerability as much as I claim they can,
then is FPP just a harmless, gratuitous principle? I’m afraid it is not.
When the authors endorse supplementing retributive theory with
the consequentialist equality approach of FPP, they are suggesting a
significant change in the retributive approach, at least in some cases. The
idea of imposing on the state a broad egalitarian duty to protect crime
victims certainly sounds appealing. But supplementing retributivism in this
way doesn’t give us something for nothing. We lose retributivism’s focus
on the retrospective punishment of an actor in accordance with his just
deserts, and its insistence on fairness to the individual defendant even at
the expense of significant social benefits.
Isolating a pure illustration of the conflict is not easy, for FPP and
the retributive WC approach often dovetail.

FPP focuses on deterring

defendants who would prey on the vulnerable.

WC, as applied to

punishment of crimes against the vulnerable, emphasizes retrospective
punishment of defendants who, by preying on the vulnerable, have
demonstrated greater culpability or caused greater wrong.

Both

deterrence and retributive blame might be reasonably well-served by
requiring that the defendant have a culpable mental state (for example, at
least negligence) with respect to harming a person in a specified
vulnerable class (for example, the elderly).
But the approaches sometimes diverge. First, although a wide
variety of forms of “wrongdoing” can be encompassed within a retributive
theory, in the end any such theory will include some forms of wrong and
exclude others. Once the appropriate content of wrongdoing is specified,
additional equality concerns may arise about whether, once the criminal
law is actually enforced, the state provides equal protection to the class of
victims of “wrongs” so defined. But these additional equality concerns
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about unequal vulnerability are indeed external to the retributive theory.
On a retributive theory, those additional, external equality concerns, unlike
internal

equality

concerns

encompassed

within

the

criterion

of

“wrongdoing” itself, can only be addressed by prosecutorial practices, not
by varying the legal sanction for the crime (as I explain more fully below).
Second, sometimes FPP would support strict criminal liability, while
a culpability-based retributivism would not. In some circumstances, strict
liability might indeed be effective in furthering FPP: so long as a victim of
an assault honestly believes that she was selected on racial grounds, FPP
might justify enhancement, even if the offender actually did not act on that
basis.56

Such a rule is clearly inconsistent with culpability-based

retributivism, but it might serve the consequentialist egalitarian goal of
minimizing racially selective assaults. After all, it avoids the serious proof
problems posed by racial selection (not to mention racial animus) statutes.
Although this approach does create social costs by imposing additional
punishment upon defendants who “objectively” did not violate the
egalitarian norm, whether those costs exceed these other benefits is an
empirical question; we cannot assume a positive answer in advance.57
A powerful illustration of how FPP can generate problematic results
that retributive theory would not permit is the authors’ analysis of the
“Violent Showoff” example, an example that has become a staple in the
bias crime literature. They suggest that their FPP model would support
prosecution for a bias crime even if a defendant attacked a particular
56

It might be objected that if the victim believes that she has been selected on a racial

basis, but actually she has not been, FPP is not violated. But this depends on which
interpretation of FPP is being defended.

If we wish to offer victims the subjective

satisfaction of feeling equally protected against crime, then it would be defensible to
endorse a principle protecting those who merely believe that they are more vulnerable.
57

Similarly, even more troubling forms of strict liability might serve FPP. Suppose that

making parents strictly liable for the crimes of their children would have a significant
deterrent impact, especially on offenders who prey on the most vulnerable victims.
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victim only to impress his (biased) friends, and even if he had no idea that
they were motivated by racial bias.

Even in the absence of such

knowledge, the authors assert, such a “Violent Show-Off” poses an
additional risk to minorities’ safety, and that is enough to justify a higher
penalty.58 Thus, the authors go beyond even the view that criminal liability
is warranted for offenders who are willing to effectuate the known
prejudices of others.

Their analysis both supports the criticism made

above, that they ignore how racial equality rather than vulnerability is the
principal value at stake in bias crime legislation; and also reveals that in
some cases, the FPP approach really does reach results inconsistent with
a retributivist approach.
To see this point even more vividly, consider the following example,
which I will dub “The Ignorant Initiate.” Suppose the defendant wants to
join a gang, and as part of the initiation rite, he must beat up the victim, an
unidentified person whom the gang has kidnapped and placed inside a
canvas bag. He does beat up the victim, but he is unaware (and has no
reason to suppose) that the gang has deliberately chosen a victim who is
a member of a different racial group than the defendant and the gang
members. The authors’ analysis of the “Violent Show-off” entails that they
would support convicting this defendant, and not just the gang members,
of a bias crime!
Moreover, if the authors also mean to endorse FPP even when it
counsels a lesser penalty than WC would warrant, then another type of
conflict is possible. For sometimes FPP might not support criminal liability
when retributivism clearly would—specifically, in those cases where
criminal punishment might have little or no deterrent impact, but where
defendants are still quite blameworthy. At least some categories of bias
crimes might fit this description—perhaps the most impulsive bias crimes,
or bias crimes by persons who consider a criminal conviction a badge of
58

“On Hate and Equality,” at 534 (discussing Lawrence’s analysis).
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honor, or who obtain such extraordinary sadistic pleasure from the crime
that the prospect of a criminal penalty will have no measurable deterrent
impact. In such cases, presumably, additional punishment on account of
bias will not serve FPP’s intended goal of protecting more vulnerable
victims.
Indeed, if FPP has this kind of preemptive force, it might have the
far-reaching effect of undermining the basic culpability structure of the
criminal law. Penalty gradations are based (inter alia) on gradations in
mental state.

A purposeful killing is punished more harshly than a

reckless killing, which is punished more harshly than a negligent killing.
Yet, from the victim’s perspective, a death is a death.59 If that is what
matters most, then it would seem that we should equalize victims’
vulnerability to death, whatever the culpability with which the killer acts.
And equalization might, depending on the facts (relevant to effective
strategies for overcoming differential vulnerability), require that we throw
out the usual mental state categories entirely, or punish some negligent
killings much more harshly than some intentional ones.60 In short, a focus
on equalizing vulnerability might open the door to a thoroughgoing
consequentialism that largely displaces principles of just deserts.
One way to avoid the conflict while preserving retributive values is
to apply the egalitarian norms in FPP only in investigatory and
prosecutorial decisions, not in the determination of criminal sanctions. As
59

To be sure, sometimes the mental state with which the death is inflicted affects the

degree of emotional harm that the victim suffers prior to death, and affects the degree of
harm suffered by others; but the death itself will normally be the vastly predominant
element of harm.
60

In this example, culpability as to the death is the only culpability at issue; while in bias

crimes, the offender has already acted culpably with respect to a criminal wrong, and the
culpability at issue concerns the reason why he selected the victim. Nevertheless, it
seems that a FPP focused on victims is susceptible to the same criticism in both
situations.
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the authors note, such decisions often do incorporate concerns about fair
application of criminal law norms to the most vulnerable. Violent inner-city
neighborhoods, and any other neighborhoods highly susceptible to violent
crime, obviously do and should obtain a disproportionate share of police
and prosecutorial resources (relative to population). But employing FPP
here raises no concerns about proportionality and just deserts.61
A second way to avoid the conflict is to apply FPP norms outside
the criminal context. The authors treat criminal law in isolation from other
systems of moral condemnation, social control and social assistance. But
tort law can compensate victims and vindicate their rights. Administrative
law can license, fine, and enjoin, and can authorize victim remedies.
Social and economic programs can pay special heed to the plight of the
vulnerable. Why must criminal law, too, be dominated by concern for the
victim, without regard to the actor’s just deserts?
A third possible way to resolve the conflict is to consider evidence
that the victim was unusually vulnerable only at sentencing, but to allow
such evidence whether or not defendant was culpable with respect to that
circumstance. This approach at least has the merit of not undermining
substantive criminal law norms.

But a genuine retributive perspective

must reject this solution. Giving weight to factors in conflict with retributive

61

To be sure, retributivists should also be concerned about prosecutorial discretion: if the

state is utterly indifferent to prosecuting some serious crimes, then this predictably results
in the offenders receiving less than their just deserts. The difficult question of how a
nonconsequentialist

punishment

rationale

like

retributivism

prosecutorial discretion is beyond the scope of this essay.

appropriately

limits

Although retributivist

constraints must exist, they will play out quite differently from consequentialist
constraints. Among other things, a retributivist, unlike a consequentialist, still can insist
on one very important proportionality constraint: at trial, the state must prove that a
retributively acceptable substantive criminal law norm has been violated beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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constraints is troubling even when it is less visible.62 Significantly, the
Federal sentencing guidelines, which do give weight to whether the victim
of a crime was vulnerable, only allow enhancement if the defendant “knew
or should have known” that the victim was unusually vulnerable.63

62

The authors actually acknowledge that visibility is a good reason for incorporating the

egalitarian concerns of FPP into the substantive criminal law, rather than as sentencing
guidelines. “On Hate and Equality,” at 538 n. 78.
63

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.1(b) (1998). The authors assert that these

guidelines could reflect either WC or FPP (in the sense that the vulnerable victim needs
special protection because she cannot easily defend herself). “On Hate and Equality,” at
530-531. But their assertion is undercut by this culpability requirement, a requirement
that the authors do not discuss and that is better explained by WC than by FPP.
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Conclusion

An important theme throughout the authors’ essay is the complaint
that the retributivist/WC approach discounts the interests of the victim of
crime.64 Indeed, they complain that that approach “is heavily biased in
favor of criminal offenders.”65 Insofar as this just amounts to the objection
that retributivism cannot account for either egalitarian values or the
problem of especially vulnerable victims, the objection is misplaced, for
reasons I have explained. But if this amounts to the broader objection that
any use of the criminal law that will be effective in protecting victims
should be permissible, the objection confronts the bedrock retributive
principle that adequate personal responsibility is a prerequisite to just
criminal punishment. Strict liability, criminal punishment of children, and
criminal punishment of the innocent are but a few members of the parade
of horribles that retributivists can legitimately trot out in response to the
objection.

64

See e.g. id. at 508 (“The [WC] paradigm assigns no independent importance to the

crime victim.”).
65

Id. at 508. As they elaborate: “Because the criminal offender controls, to a large

extent, both her conduct and her mental state, the [WC] paradigm confers upon the
criminal offender the power to dictate the content of criminal prohibitions and the
sanctions imposed for violating them.” This is a strange characterization of how crimes
occur—as if a criminal offender chooses her state of mind (intention, knowledge,
reckless, or negligence) off a mental rack. In any event, to a retributivist, focusing on the
actor’s chosen conduct and on the mental state he exhibits in so acting is no more a
“bias” in favor of the actor than focusing on the harm to a tort victim is a “bias” in favor of
that victim. If the distinctive rationale for criminal punishment should be just deserts, then
we must focus on the actor; just as we must focus on harm to a tort victim if the
distinctive rationale for tort compensation is corrective justice. In either case, of course, if
the legal institution of punishment or liability has no distinctive rationale but is merely one
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In this comment, I have argued that retributive theory can justify
higher sanctions for bias crimes, and that it can do so more easily than the
problematic fair protection principle (FPP can. But I do not take a position
here on some important questions. How great an increase in sanction can
be justified under the most persuasive retributive account? Which other
culpable motives, and which other affronts to egalitarian social values,
should be treated as harshly as bias crimes?
account, is “bias” best understood?

How, on a retributive

For example, my position is

consistent with rejecting the severe punishment supplements permitted
under some current legislation66; with endorsing a larger punishment

cog in a larger consequentialist machine, then it would follow that any use of the cog that
does not optimize the desired consequences is “biased.”
66

For example, in Alabama, bias motivation increases the minimum penalty for Class A

felonies from 10 to 15 years imprisonment, and for Class B felonies from 2 to 10 years.
Ala. St. §§ 13A-5-6, 13A-5-13 (1997). In many states, bias motivation increases the
authorized punishment for a crime by one degree—for example, increasing a Class B
felony to a class A, or a second degree misdemeanor to first degree. See, e.g., Fla. St.
Ann. §775.085 (1998); Neb. Rev. St. §28-111 (1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2927.12
(1998). The effect of such a category increase is often a substantial increase in the
maximum punishment permitted, if not the minimum punishment required. For example,
in Florida, any felony of the second degree that is based on prejudice is punishable as a
felony of the first degree; thus, the authorized maximum penalty increases from 15 years
imprisonment to 30. And the punishment for any third degree felony based on prejudice
can increase from a maximum of 5 years to the 15 years authorized for a second degree
felony. Fla. St. Ann. §775.082.
In Apprendi v. New York, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), the Supreme Court recently
struck down as unconstitutional a New Jersey statutory scheme that permits an increase
in the maximum penalty for a “second-degree” offense from 10 to 20 years based on a
judge’s finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant acted with a
purpose to intimidate because of race or other prohibited criteria.

The specific

constitutional defect was the state’s failure to require that the aggravating fact be proven
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. If such a requirement were in place, however, it is
very likely that the penalty enhancement would be constitutional. For the Court has
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supplement for assaults motivated by sadistic pleasure or by pecuniary
gain than for assaults motivated by bias; and with restricting “bias” to
offenders directly motivated by racial hostility or prejudice.
Nor do I question the importance of the egalitarian goals underlying
the authors’ approach.

Unequal administration of the criminal law is

obviously a compelling social problem, especially when it reinforces racial
division and poverty.

But the authors’ more radical suggestion that

retributive principles be significantly compromised in order to achieve
otherwise valuable egalitarian goals is usually unnecessary, and in any
case indefensible.

treated the Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement as imposing only a weak
constraint on the permissible length of imprisonment. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding mandatory life term for possession of more than 650 grams of
cocaine). Nevertheless, as a matter of justifiable penal policy, I believe that retributivists
can and should defend a stronger constraint than this.

